MANDATORY LABOR ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS, AND THE FUTURE OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT:
14 United States Supreme Court dramatically endorsed mandatory labor arbitration, rather than external litigation, to resolve statutory claims of un-lawful age-based employment discrimination brought by unionrepresented employees subject to such a provision in their labor contract. 3 The Court summarily isolated and trivialized as jurisprudentially obsolete, but did not deem it necessary to formally overrule, thirty-five years of well-established precedent 4 that had protected the employee's right to litigate de novo statutory claims of unlawful employment discrimination without suffering any res judicata or collateral estoppel effects from a prior adverse arbitration decision. 5 The Court substantially clarified, and perhaps simplified, what had become an increasingly complex and potentially inconsistent panorama of decisions as to whether union-represented employees can be mandated to arbitrate, and thus be foreclosed from litigating de novo, statutory claims. With its controversial activist methodology, the political and ideological Court ran roughshod over stare decisis principles. 6 As a result, a host of questions, ramifications, and unintended consequences of the Pyett decision could transform the dynamics of arbitration well beyond the present contours of union-represented employment environments. Pyett decision perhaps reached the correct result-favoring a single, globalized, omnibus arbitration rather than second bites at the apple in serial litigation." However, the Court engaged in deeply problematic and severely truncated reasoning. Pyett is not the rare exception. The phenomenon of the Court reaching the correct result, but through badly fractured and spasmodic reasoning, while not the norm, occurs with some frequency. 9 Pragmatically however, a sound functional result from a problematic and jagged opinion is markedly superior to an elegant theory yielding an obsolete and incorrect result. The great practical utility of these principles is especially true in labor and employment law. Pyett is certainly not the first, nor will it be the last decision of the Court that, while not elegantly grounded in sophisticated jurisprudential metaphysics, may nevertheless work well and yield just and fair results' 0 for employees, employers, and unions who favor a single, integrated arbitration forum for the resolution of all contractual and statutory claims. Meanwhile, those employees, employers, and unions wishing to retain independent judicial recourse for statutory claims are not precluded from doing so and are left unaffected by the Pyett decision. An omnibus mandatory labor arbitration mechanism to hear all issues, including all statutory claims, must be the deliberate, negotiated product of the parties, and be unequivocally set forth in the par-ties' collective bargaining agreement. As the Supreme Court ruled in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.," the labor contract provision for mandatory arbitration of all statutory claims must be clear and unmistakable in order to constitute a waiver of the employees' GardnerDenver right to pursue subsequent external litigation of statutory claims. A general fair employment practices declaration by the parties will be manifestly insufficient to be considered a Pyett waiver of the employees' right to litigate separately in court their statutory claims. This Article will examine Pyett's place among these considerations. Part I of the Article will present a synoptic chronology of the prior pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court. Part II will set forth the Second Circuit's experience setting the stage for Pyett, while Part III will focus on the Supreme Court's Pyett decision. Part IV will assess the likely ramifications of this important decision.
In a necessarily chronological, but decidedly less than linear fashion, the Supreme Court has articulated a series of benchmarks bearing on the "arbitration or litigation" dynamic, commencing with its landmark unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver' 2 in 1974.13 Alex- ander was a member of a labor union and was protected by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 14 Through the union, the grievance pro-testing his discharge was taken to arbitration. 15 The grievance was denied and the discharge sustained. 16 Alexander then filed a lawsuit in federal district court, alleging that he had been unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of his race. 17 The employer, Gardner-Denver, unsuccessfully argued that the adverse arbitration award had res judicata effect and thus precluded his subsequent litigation. 18 The Supreme Court, however, found that Alexander had the right to a de novo trial in federal district court regarding his statutory claims of alleged unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of his race. 19 He was not foreclosed by the prior adverse arbitration decision, which did not have res judicata effect because "an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement."
20
Perhaps the most compelling rationale for preserving the subsequent external litigation avenue is grounded in the jurisprudential and practical reality that courts may sometimes be the best and only recourse for employees. This deep mistrust of "private justice" 2 1 is reflected in the populist, class-based ideology that states that employment relationships are essentially adhesion contracts, with the dominant, corporate employer dictating terms to the helpless, subordinated worker. 22 To entirely privatize the resolution of disputes through mandatory arbitration, and to foreclose external litigation, is to ignore Justice Douglas' fundamental truth that " [t] 20101 [Vol. 19:429 nies. 31 He was hired and worked until the companies found out about his workers' compensation claim. 32 The companies refused to allow him to work, claiming he was "unqualified" due to his disability, despite the fact that he had been performing his duties adequately. 33 Pursuant to his union's advice, Wright filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), ignoring an all-encompassing arbitration provision in the applicable CBA.
34
Justice Scalia and the majority distinguished Wright from both Gilmer and Gardner-Denver. First, the Court noted that the presumption of arbitrability it had previously expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy should "not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, i.e., that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA. '' 35 Here, however, the CBA only called for arbitration of all disputes in general, and the federal court system was deemed better suited for a claim under the ADA.
36
Next, the Court found that "the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA. '' 37 If such a waiver of rights is to be upheld, the waiver must be stated in "clear and unmistakable" language. 38 This stringent requirement necessary to find effective waiver of individual statutory claims was not met here. 39 Consequently, the Court had no need to discuss whether an explicit union waiver would have been upheld. 40 The decision in Gilmer was not affected because the employee there waived his own individual rights, negating the need for the standard to apply. nation claims brought by a nonunionized employee. 42 Upon being hired by Circuit City, Adams signed an employment contract that included a mandatory arbitration agreement. 4 3 Two years later, when Adams filed an employment discrimination suit in California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not apply to employment contracts, and therefore Adams did not have to use arbitration to settle his claim. 44 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarity the extent of the FAA's exemption for certain contracts.
5
The Court held that the exemption to the FAA concerned only employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees, and those "actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce. '46 The interpretation used by the Ninth Circuit and others made the exemption superfluous. 47 According to the Supreme Court, if the exemption was meant to apply to all contracts of employment, it would have said so.
48
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Circuit City decision for present purposes is that the Court did not regard the former employee as having irrevocably waived his statutory claims. 49 Rather, the Court deemed Adams to have agreed to the arbitral, rather than judicial, forum for the resolution of his statutory claims. 50 Thus, the Supreme Court set the stage for its decision in Pyett on the grounds of the adequate waiver of the right to bring statutory claims de novo-themes exhaustively treated in Gilmer and Wright, and in a panorama of lower court decisions. [Vol. 19:429 employees waived their right to litigate statutory claims, including alleged unlawful employment discrimination, in federal court. 52 Susan Rogers was a clerical employee of New York University (NYU), and subject to the CBA between NYU and Local 3882, United Staff Association of NYU, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. 53 The CBA contained a nodiscrimination provision, guaranteeing employees the protections of all federal and state discrimination laws, including the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).
54
Rogers went on medical leave under the FMLA in August 1997.
55
NYU terminated Rogers three months later, purportedly because her leave time had expired. 56 She filed a claim of unlawful employment discrimination with the EEOC, which issued her a right-to-sue letter. 57 In March 1998, she filed a lawsuit against NYU in federal court in the Southern District of New York. 58 In her claim, Rogers alleged that NYU discriminated against her in violation of the FMLA, ADA, and the New York State and City human rights laws.
59
NYU moved to stay the lawsuit under § 3 of the FAA. 60 The district court set forth two separate reasons for denying NYU's motion. First, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Gardner-Denver for the principle that employees cannot waive their right, via a CBA, to bring federal statutory actions in federal court. 61 Second, the district court held that while Gardner-Denver is sufficient to resolve the issue, the same conclusion could be reached by applying a different line of reasoning articulated by the Supreme Court in Wright. 62 In Wright, the Supreme Court suggested that a provision waiving an employee's right to bring federal statutory actions in federal court may be enforceable under certain circumstances; however, it held that a condition precedent to the enforceability of such a provision is that the language of the waiver be clear and unmistakable. 63 The district court held that the waiver in the NYU CBA did not meet this important threshold of being a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of Rogers' right to bring external litigation.
64
Consequently, even if such a waiver were not barred by Gardner-Denver, it failed to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard set forth in Wright.
5
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, maintaining that both lines of reasoning were correct. 66 It refused to enforce a CBA's mandatory arbitration provision that would have resulted in a waiver of an employee's right to litigate a statutory claim in federal court. 67 The Second Circuit explained that while Wright questioned Gardner-Denver, the latter was not overruled and was still good law. 68 The Supreme Court denied NYU's petition for a writ of certiorari, 69 setting the stage for Pyett. [Vol. 19:429 far as it waived the worker's right to litigate federal statutory causes of action in a judicial forum.
72
In Pyett, the plaintiffs, all over the age of fifty, were longtime employees of Temco Services Industries. 73 They were originally employed as night watchmen in a commercial office building. 74 The plaintiffs were also members of Local 32BJ of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and were subject to a CBA between the Union and the Realty Advisory Board (RAB) on Labor Relations, Inc., the bargaining association for the real estate industry in New York City. 75 The 2002 "Contractors Agreement," governing the period from January 1, 2002 through September 30, 2004, covered the events giving rise to this matter.
76
SEIU and the RAB have had a labor management relationship, reflected in a CBA, since the 1930s. 7 7 Since 1999, the CBA has expressly provided that employment discrimination claims are subject to mandatory arbitration:
There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code, New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, Connecticut Fair Employer Practices Act, or any other similar laws, rules or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure (Articles V and VI [of the CBA]) as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination. tions as porters and cleaners. 79 They alleged the unwelcome reassignment was made because they were the only building employees over the age of fifty. 80 The plaintiffs also alleged violations of seniority rules and failure of the employer to equitably rotate and allocate overtime opportunities. 8 1 They alleged that the transfer was in violation of the CBA's provisions prohibiting, inter alia, unlawful age discrimination.
82
After the first day of the arbitration hearing, SEIU declined to pursue the age discrimination claims, addressing only those elements of the grievance based on denials of overtime and promotions. 83 SEIU had consented to the Penn Plaza management bringing in Spartan Security to provide security services previously performed by Temco. 84 SEIU believed that this did not constitute unlawful age discrimination. 8 5 On February 23, 2004, they sent a letter to the Contract Arbitrator, Earl Pfeffer, formally withdrawing the age discrimination claims from arbitration. In May 2004, while the arbitration was still ongoing, the plaintiffs also filed charges of age discrimination with the EEOC. 89 The EEOC subsequently notified the plaintiffs of their right to sue the employer in federal district court for unlawful age discrimination. 90 Law. 92 Further, the employees claimed that the SEIU violated its duty of fair representation by its failure to pursue the age discrimination claims during the arbitration. 93 The defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and, in the alternative, to compel arbitration.
94
The district court denied both motions. 95 The court relied on its decision in Granados v. Harvard Maintenance 96 to conclude that a "union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain federal and state statutory claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable. '97 The defendants appealed, claiming that the Supreme Court's decision regarding arbitration provisions in Gilmer permitted the enforcement of the mandatory arbitration provision. 98 However, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's reasoning that Gilmer applied to arbitration clauses solely in individual contracts, and not to CBAs, 99 and upheld the district court's conclusion that Gilmer did not apply here because the plaintiffs were subject to a CBA and did not have Gilmer-like individual employment contracts. 10 0 The Second Circuit relied on its ruling in Rogers to hold that Gardner-Denver controlled the case at issue.101
The Second Circuit further held that the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, which contained dicta strongly suggesting that in some circumstances a union-negotiated waiver of a worker's right to litigate statutory claims in federal court could be enforceable, did not itself overrule Gardner-Denver.1 0 2 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to enforce the labor contract's mandatory arbitration provision. The Second Circuit reiterated that Gardner-Denver "remains good law," and held in Pyett "that a collective agreement could not waive covered workers' rights to a judicial forum for causes of action created by Congress." 1 0 6 The Second Circuit thus endeavored to meld the principles of Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, holding that, while a non-unionized individual could elect arbitration of statutory claims, no labor union could institutionally bind its individual constituent members and fellow employees via such a waiver mechanism in a labor contract. 10 7 This manifest incongruity, as well as the unresolved issues left in the wake of the Wright decision, militated strongly in favor of the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. 108 Unsurprisingly, most of the courts of appeals that examined whether a union and employer could require unionized employees to bring all of their statutory employment discrimination claims to arbitration, and thus be foreclosed from external litigation of those claims, had consistently maintained that only the Supreme Court could clarify and prioritize the constellation of pertinent decisions flowing from Gardner-Denver. 10 Justice Thomas explained that the Second Circuit faced a dissimilar situation in Pyett-a CBA containing an arbitration provision that included both contractual and statutory discrimination claims-thus, reliance on Gardner-Denver was inappropriate.'
15
Justice Thomas noted that, from the outset, the labor contract's very broad arbitration provision was the product of good faith negotiations.
16
The parties expressly decided that statutory claims "would be resolved in arbitration." ' 1 7 The majority opinion noted that "this freely negotiated term between the Union and the RAB easily qualifies as a 'condition of employment' that is subject to mandatory bargaining." ' 18 Justice Thomas concluded:
Examination of the two federal statutes at issue in this case, therefore, yields a straightforward answer to the question presented: the NLRA provided the union and the RAB with statutory authority to collectively bargain for arbitration of workplace discrimination claims, and Congress did not terminate that authority with respect to federal age-discrimination claims in the ADEA. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to strike down an arbitration clause in this CBA, which was freely negotiated by the Union and the RAB, which clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbitrate the age-discrimination claims at issue in this appeal. Congress has chosen to allow arbitration of ADEA claims. To the majority, it is Congress, not the Court, that establishes federal labor policy, and the broad arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably negotiated by the parties is fully congruent with the congressional policy choice favoring arbitration over litigation as the preferred means of settling labor disputes.
120 Pyett broadened this policy choice to include mandatory labor arbitration of employment discrimination claims if such arbitration is required by a CBA.
1
The majority acknowledged that Gardner-Denver and its progeny contained extensive dicta that criticized arbitration as an inappropriate forum for the resolution of statutory employment discrimination claims.
122 Justice Thomas opined that this critical, problematic dicta was a result of a negative, parochial, and hostile view of arbitration that had "fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method [labor arbitration] of resolving [employment discrimination] disputes."' 1 3 The "misconceptions" about arbitrators lacking sufficient expertise with Title VII and other statutory rightsbased antidiscrimination law "have been corrected."' 24 Justice Thomas summarized for the majority: "We recognize that ... the Gardner-Denver line of cases included broad dicta that was highly critical of the use of arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights. That skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned. "' 125 Justice Thomas explained that the majority was not overruling Gardner-Denver; rather, Gardner-Denver was simply inapplicable with respect to Pyett: "Gardner-Denver and its progeny thus do not control the outcome where, as is the case here, the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and contractual discrimination claims."' 126 Justice Thomas stated in a footnote that if Gardner-Denver had applied, the Court would likely have overruled it due to the Court's current pro-arbitration jurisprudence. [Vol. 19:429 represented by Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. 128 In a preemptive repudiation of Justice Souter's dissent, the Pyett majority accused him of "wrench [ing] ... out of context" what he portrayed as "Wright's characterization of Gardner-Denver as raising a seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal forum rights," and concluded that "Wright therefore neither endorsed Gardner-Denver's broad language nor suggested a particular result in this case." 12 9
Summarizing Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald, Justice Thomas characterized the underlying facts in those three earlier cases favoring litigation over arbitration of statutory claims as "reveal[ing] the narrow scope of the legal rule arising from that trilogy of decisions." 130 The majority concluded that the Denver trilogy of cases made clear that the Gardner-Denver line of cases 'did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.' Those decisions instead 'involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions.'131
The Court, reiterating that "federal antidiscrimination rights may not be prospectively waived,"' 132 found no such waiver in Pyett. "The decision to resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the first instance." 1 33 Further, "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." ' 134 The arbitration decision remains subject to judicial review.
Justice Thomas stated that to read Gardner-Denver as somehow prohibiting all waivers of all statutory rights "reveals a distorted understanding of the compromise made when an employee agrees to compulsory arbitration." 136 Therefore, the majority ultimately concluded that "because today's decision does not contradict the holding of GardnerDenver, we need not resolve the stare decisis concerns raised by the dissenting opinions." 137 Nevertheless, in a possible preview of coming attractions, the majority all but sounded the death knell for the GardnerDenver line of cases, concluding that "given the development of this Court's arbitration jurisprudence in the intervening years ... GardnerDenver would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling if the dissents' broad view of its holding were correct." 3 8
In upholding the enforcement of the arbitration clause, the majority not only dispelled the Second Circuit's Gardner-Denver analysis as inapplicable, but also explained why the very broad arbitration provision in Pyett should be enforced. The majority held that the arbitration clause was a "freely negotiated term between the Union and the RAB [that] easily qualifies as a 'condition of employment' that is subject to mandatory bargaining" under 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).1 39 Accordingly, the clause must be enforced unless the ADEA itself specifically removed grievances made under it from the NLRA's authority. 140 The majority referred to the holding in Gilmer that the ADEA does not prohibit arbitrating claims brought under the statute.
14 1 Accordingly, in Pyett, a clause calling for the arbitration of an ADEA claim brought by a union member bound by the CBA was enforceable.
142
The Pyett majority declined to resolve several issues. Pyett and his colleagues also made separate arguments that the arbitration clause was not clear and unmistakable, which could nullify its validity. 143 The majority declined to address this issue as the class of grievants did not raise the argument in the lower courts.
144 Additionally, the grievants argued that the arbitration clause functioned as a waiver of their federal right under the ADEA, as it precluded them from a federal judicial forum, and S. 190, 199 (1991) also permitted the union to block arbitration. 4 5 However, the majority explained that since this issue was not fully briefed, and there were existing factual disputes, it would not resolve this issue either. 14 6 Finally, whether the labor contract allows the union to prevent employees "from 'effectively vindicating' their 'federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum'" remains an open question for a future day.
147

B. The Dissents
Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg. They maintained that Gardner-Denver established a "seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal forum rights," which was expressly reaffirmed by the Court in Wright. 148 As Justice Souter noted: "In sum, Gardner-Denver held that an individual's statutory right of freedom from discrimination and access to court for enforcement were beyond a union's power to waive."' 149 This holding had been "repeated over the years and generally understood," and the majority ignored the principle of stare decisis by radically diverging from the rationale of Gardner-Denver and enforcing the arbitration clause.
150
Justice Souter's dissent asserted that if the Gardner-Denver holding was actually as narrow as the majority found, then for thirty-five years the Court had been "wreaking havoc on the truth" when it held that there was an absolute prohibition of union waiver of employee's federal forum rights: 15
The majority evades the precedent of Gardner-Denver as long as it can simply by ignoring it.... [B]ut the issue is settled and the time is too late by 35 years to make the bald assertion that '[n]othing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration agreements signed by the individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative.' In fact, we recently and unanimously said that the principle that 'federal forum rights cannot be waived in union-negotiated CBAs even if they can be waived in individually executed contracts ... assuredly finds support in' our case law, and every 145 See id. at 1474. The majority noted that "a substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld." Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) Court of Appeals save one has read our decisions as holding to this position.
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Interestingly, Justice Souter's dissent also noted that the majority opinion may ultimately be of little consequence, other than being a glaring, infamous incident of dramatic and unwarranted judicial repudiation of the principle of stare decisis.
15 3 Justice Souter explained that the majority left open a significant question, as it "explicitly reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is enforceable when the union controls access to and presentation of employees' claims in arbitration." 154 Justice Souter explained that this is often the situation, and it is likely that this issue, which has been a point of contention for almost four decades, will remain a source of controversy unless and until it is definitively resolved by a future Supreme Court decision.
55
Perhaps most strikingly, Justice Souter's dissent identified the principles of stare decisis that the majority abandoned:
Principles of stare decisis demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so, those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon which the rule of law depends. And considerations of stare decisis have special force over an issue of statutory interpretation . . . Once we have construed a statute, stability is the rule, and we will not depart from it without some compelling justification. There is no argument for abandoning precedent here, and Gardner-Denver controls. 156 Justice Stevens, who joined Justice Souter's dissent, also wrote separately to emphasize his profound disagreement with the majority's repudiation of stare decisis.
157 Justice Stevens forcefully asserted that the majority arrogantly ignored public policy appropriately established by Congress: "The Court's derision of that 'policy concern' is particularly disingenuous given its subversion of Gardner-Denver's holding in the service of an extratextual policy favoring arbitration." 158 Justice Stevens was deeply disturbed by the raw judicial activism of the Court's majority, particularly since Gardner-Denver established quite unequivocally The jurisprudential realpolitik of the Pyett decision is dramatically obvious. Stark ideological and political warfare continues between the Court's core conservative majority and the liberal minority. This is thoroughly transparent and yields no surprises. The conservatives favor major institutional interests of employers and of unions, at workers' expense. Concomitantly, the liberal minority is relatively more solicitous of workers, especially individuals who are sometimes shabbily treated by unions and employers or, at the very least, are generally more vulnerable and have fewer resources than these institutional counterparts.
Justice Souter's dissent treats Pyett as an aberration. Justice Souter was especially incensed that such a potentially tectonic shift so inimical to workers' interests was the shameless product of blatant activist arrogance by an ideological majority openly contemptuous of stare decisis and thirty-five years of the well-established Gardner-Denver line of cases. 16 1 Justice Souter hoped that the Gardner-Denver rationale would not only continue to percolate under Pyett's ill-fitting and unstable lid, but that Gardner-Denver would, under a new liberal majority, soon reemerge and be reestablished as the controlling law, substantially strengthened, paradoxically, by the Pyett dissents. With the exceptions of Gilmer and Pyett, the Supreme Court has eschewed the integrated coherence of arbitration for the dynamic of a labor arbitration followed by external litigation de novo regarding statutory employment discrimination claims.
Nevertheless, to attempt to somehow resuscitate the dated GardnerDenver rationale would be a mistake. Pyett deserves a fair opportunity to work. While there are a multitude of open questions flowing from the ramifications, both intended and.unintended, of the majority's decision, the major elements of justice and fairness to employees, employers, and unions are within Pyett probabilities, and they deserve the opportunity to become operational.
B. Why the Court's "Right" Result Isn't Wrong
The argument for continuing fealty to the thirty-five-year-old Gardner-Denver rationale is, at best, anemic and out of touch with positive developments -in labor and employment arbitration in recent years. As Justice Holmes would remind us, it is a poor excuse to have a law just because it was a law in the time of King Henry IV.162 Even assuming there ever was any legitimate basis for anyone to fear that prominent labor arbitrators notoriously lacked sufficient expertise in employment discrimination law, these concerns are simply not well-founded today. The American Arbitration Association, for example, conducts fastidious scrutiny of the already highly qualified and accomplished arbitrators it admits to its panels of arbitrators available to prospective parties. It also demands that each arbitrator make a career-long commitment to the state-of-the-art study of arbitration.
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On the eve of a half-century of Supreme Court enthusiasm for labor arbitration, manifested in its 1960 landmark Steelworkers Trilogy decisions, 16 4 the Pyett Court reached the correct result, via admittedly somewhat problematic and truncated reasoning that could potentially cause a degree of jurisprudential and practical instability in labor arbitration and in the courts. However, the Pyett decision, having achieved the correct result, deserves the opportunity to work in the real world, and parties with such omnibus arbitration provisions in their CBAs deserve the benefit of their one bite at the integrated, globalized apple.
The phenomenon of the Court reaching the correct result, despite, rather than through its particular reasoning, does occur.16 5 As a practical matter, it is obviously better to have a sound and workable decision, rather than an unworkable result flowing from complex abstract jurisprudential theory. 165 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9 (deploring the reasoning of Roe v. Wade, while still favoring the result).
The great practical utility and insight of these principles are especially true in labor and employment law. Pyett is certainly not the first, nor will it be the last decision of the Supreme Court that, while not elegantly grounded in sophisticated jurisprudential metaphysics, may nevertheless work well and yield just and fair results for employees, employers, and unions. Whether Gardner-Denver or Pyett controls, the stakes are significant for everyone. Unions will have continuing concerns about exposure to liability from lawsuits alleging breach of the union duty of fair representation under either model.
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The employer, 14 Penn Plaza LLC, warned during oral argument before the Supreme Court that "forbidding unions from bargaining about the procedural right to an arbitral forum will carve a judicial exception into the labor law permitting employees to bypass the union and deal directly with their employees, defeating Congress's national labor policy."
16 7 To bring all grievance claims, including those involving statutory rights, such as employment discrimination claims, into one integrated arbitration could be problematic, however. The grievance process could become rigid. If the parties begin taking all statutory claims into arbitration, the dispute resolution process could become flooded with grievances and with both parties feeling little can be gained by settling grievances earlier in the procedure. 168 Yet, to repudiate Pyett would undermine the role of the union as the exclusive bargaining agent, and would encourage employees to deal directly with employers, in derogation of Congress's central role in setting "national labor policy. [ Vol. 19:429 individual must have the right to arbitrate it on his own," 18 4 a framing of the issue that the employer "wholeheartedly endorse [d] ."' fees would be the responsibility of the individual worker, and not of the union. 187 For all practical purposes, that could well be the end of the matter, since few grievants have the financial means to hire private counsel and absorb a share of the arbitrator's fee.
Certainly not least is the central practical question-who really pays?
188 What if the statutory claim grievant does not have funds sufficient to hire private counsel to take those statutory claims to arbitration? If the union is institutionally responsible for the cost of the grievant's attorney, it would probably be more cost-efficient for the union itself to take every statutory claim to arbitration. If, however, every statutory claim can come to arbitration, what incentive is there for the employer and the union to bargain for resolution of the grievance in the lower steps of the labor contract's grievance procedure?
Discovery could proliferate dramatically, with corresponding motion practice becoming virtually ubiquitous. These dimensions, imported from employment discrimination law, could flood and freeze the CBA's grievance arbitration system with meritless grievances to the detriment of meritorious grievances now inexorably subjected to interminable delays in an increasingly clogged and dysfunctional arbitration system. Furthermore, would the arbitrator have the authority to award the full range of remedies typically available in employment discrimination, including compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees to the prevailing party, and who would pay them? If so, where would such arbitral authority be grounded? Would it implicitly flow from the Pyett decision? Or would the labor contract have to be formally amended to allow the full range of damages and remedies available in federal court? Adding compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees considerations to the Pyett equation will significantly transform the conventional labor arbitration of the pre-Pyett era, making it unrecognizable.
The parties do have influence in this post-Pyett world. If the Pyett process becomes very expensive for the institutional parties, they remain the masters of their conduct-nothing compels parties to violate statutory employment discrimination law, for example. If the Pyett process becomes too burdensome and loses many of the distinct advantages that labor arbitration offers-specifically, significantly less time and less expense to present the case in arbitration-and instead becomes the func- [Vol. 19:429 tional equivalent of an endless federal court case extracting every last dime from the parties, the parties are also the masters, presumably, of their CBA. They are certainly free to negotiate down the many matters subject to the grievance arbitration process of the labor contract.
For example, if Pyett proves difficult to implement in practice, parties could negotiate new labor contract language that could bar bringing most, if not all, anti-discrimination matters into the grievance arbitration mechanisms of the labor contract while pledging all parties to the spirit and letter of all applicable federal, state, and local statutory law. While this may not make for the best public relations or most enlightened human resources-seemingly making the union and the employer appear as regressive and reactionary endorsers of unlawful employment discrimination-Gardner-Denver remains the fully lawful default position in the event that Pyett is not workable, as the Pyett majority readily stated that their holding does not reach, let alone overrule, Gardner-Denver.
Labor arbitration has many virtues, ranging from time and cost efficiency, due to minimal discovery and no pre-hearing motion practice, to no shifting of compensatory or punitive damages or attorney's fees to the loser. Institutional employers and unions, over time, develop mature and productive relationships, making labor grievance arbitration an important part, but only a part, of the parties' larger labor management dynamic. Under the Pyett regime, however, there is at least the potential that some of these salient positive attributes of labor arbitration could be quickly debilitated. If the Pyett-era arbitration system becomes flooded with statutory-rights claimants accompanied by their personal attorneys suing the union and the employer with hybrid Section 301/breach of the union's duty of fair representation claims, all of whom are resolutely headed for the labor arbitration of their statutory claim as a matter of right, the institutional parties will amend their labor contracts to much more carefully contour Pyett issues.
In the latter instance, employers pleased with the unitary, integrated result achieved in Pyett may come to rue the day that they no longer had to worry about Gardner-Denver external litigation of statutory claims subsequent to the labor arbitration. In the Pyett era, as employers may face arbitration of statutory claims as a matter of employee rights, a flooded grievance arbitration system overloaded with individual grievants represented by their private attorneys, resolved to arbitrate, does not present an attractive picture. Under this parade of horribles, it is possible that the employer could be held entirely responsible for the fees of both the grievant's private, personal attorney and for the fees of the arbitrator in those statutory rights cases that the union declines to take to arbitration.
Nevertheless, despite the many formidable challenges, the undeniable advantages of a unitary labor arbitration of all claims are very significant, with probable time, cost, and efficiency economies. In short order, meritless claims at labor arbitration are going to lose, and the corresponding word will quickly spread among the workers. Accordingly, statutory claims of merit will be addressed, either in arbitration or in court. Those employers and unions refusing to adopt Pyett language in their labor contract will thereby not be exempt from litigation externally in court for statutory claims that may be brought. Rather, in the absence of an omnibus Pyett-like grievance arbitration definition in the labor contract, external litigation is guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
On the eve of the half-century anniversary of the landmark Steelworkers Trilogy, the most classic of the many Supreme Court enthusiastic endorsements of labor arbitration as the preferred means of dispute resolution in the unionized labor-management relationship, much remains to be said for the reinvigoration and unequivocal restoration of Gardner-Denver precedent. But, much can also be said for judicial deference to the successful bargain made by the parties endeavoring to utilize the unitary labor arbitration as the integrated setting for the resolution of all contractual and statutory claims.
Pyett is a significant, but not radical, exception to the Gardner-Denver genre of dispute resolution modalities. For all practical purposes, unless the union and the employer expressly negotiate a Pyett provision mandating omnibus inclusion of statutory claims in the grievance arbitration procedure, Gardner-Denver remains the default position. If there is no Pyett provision, then Gardner-Denver controls, with the potential for statutory claims being subsequently litigated in court de novo after the conclusion of an arbitration proceeding that lacks any res judicata or collateral estoppel force.
Meanwhile, unfortunately due to the transparent bitterness among some of the ideologically driven Justices, and the equally raw activism marginalizing and subordinating Gardner-Denver (yet purportedly not overruling it), Pyett became one of the more contentious labor and employment decisions in the past several terms of the Supreme Court.
The more controversial implications of Pyett may catalyze and revitalize a plethora of legislative initiatives, 189 
